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Abstract: Predicting and modeling human behavior and finding trends within human 
decision-making process is a major social sciences’ problem. Rock Paper Scissors (RPS) 
is the fundamental strategic question in many game theory problems and real-world 
competitions. Finding the right approach to beat a particular human opponent is 
challenging. Here we use Markov Chains with set chain lengths as the single AIs 
(artificial intelligences) to compete against humans in iterated RPS game. This is the 
first time that an AI algorithm is applied in RPS human competition behavior studies. 
We developed an architecture of multi-AI with changeable parameters to adapt to 
different competition strategies. We introduce a parameter “focus length” (an integer of 
e.g. 5 or 10) to control the speed and sensitivity for our multi-AI to adapt to the 
opponent’s strategy change. We experimented with 52 different people, each playing 
300 rounds continuously against one specific multi-AI model, and demonstrated that 
our strategy could win over more than 95% of human opponents.  
 
 
 
 
 Introduction 
The Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS) game has been widely used to study competitive 
phenomena in society and biology, such as ecological interactions, the maintenance of 
biodiversity in ecological systems1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and price dispersion of markets10, 11. 
There are two general approaches for RPS play, Nash equilibrium randomness and 
evolving circular exploitation. As a typical example, the payoff 𝑎 , defined as the 
money incentive of the winning action divided by the money incentive of drawing 
action, is set to 2 to form a neutral RPS game12.  
Previous research has found that there is a social circle in human competitive strategy 
when playing iterated RPS games13. In this article we proposed a multi-AI algorithm 
that can exploit human strategy and win over human in the same iterated RPS games 
and we conduct experiments with human players to confirm the results. 
Our work may stimulate future more refined experimental and theoretical studies on 
the microscopic mechanisms of decision-making and learning in basic game systems14, 
15, 16, 17, 18. 
Markov chain models19 are the single models which our multi-AI is composed of. The 
assumption of a Markov chain is that the current state only depends on a finite number 
of previous states. Here the iterated RPS game is considered as a Markov process and 
Markov chains are built throughout the process of 300-rounds of competition. The 
models are built to exploit attempted circular exploitation patterns. 
The simplest discrete-time Markov chain is the first-order Markov chain, where the 
probability of moving to the next state depends only on the present state and not on the 
previous states: 
 where 𝑋1 , 𝑋2 , 𝑋3 are a sequence of random variables, Rock Paper Scissors here. 
What you will play in the next round only depends on what you played this round, like 
a short memory pattern sequence.  
Markov chains can be generalized to cases of short-term dependency, by taking into 
account recent past states in the chain. The m-th order Markov chain20 considers the 
current state to depend on m previous states, where m is finite, and is a process 
satisfying 
 
Here the m-th order Markov chain is like a model with memory length m, which 
‘remembers’ the previous m states. 
For 𝑛 < 𝑚 , all m-th order single Markov chain models will select Rock, Paper, 
Scissors randomly, with 1/3 probability each.  
We conducted experiments on the combination of several selected single models 
according to their last 5 or 10 rounds best score, we calculate all the selected single 
model results and select the one with the highest score of last 5 or 10 rounds as the 
dominant AI output for the next round. 
Here for simplicity we use AI-m to denote our single Markov chain model of order m. 
Through the experiments we found that different models work best against different 
human opponents’ competition strategies and the prediction results vary greatly so we 
build the 1st -5th order Markov chain models (i.e. AI-1 to AI-5) with different memory 
lengths for exploiting different human competition strategies. To make a multi-AI 
model that can differentiate and adapt to different human opponents, we combine the 
1st-5th order single Markov models and introduce a “focus length” parameter to control 
the adaptation speed and sensitivity to form a multi-AI that can adapt to different human 
strategies and win over most of its opponents. Table 1 illustrates how this multi-AI 
model competes against a specific player as an example with focus length F=5. 
 
Table 1. An example of our multi-AI algorithm competes against a player when F 
= 5. 
 
 
For the first round, the multi-AI will use the result from AI-1 and it rolls Rock, Paper 
or Scissors randomly with 1/3 probability each.  
Focus length parameter F is set to control the speed and sensitivity for our multi-AI 
model to adapt to the opponent’s strategy change. Our multi-AI model will look at the 
recent F rounds of history to decide which single model is currently performing the best 
and should produce the next output. For the first 4 rounds when our competition data is 
less than focus length F, which is set to 5 as before, multi-AI will simply consider all 
rounds to determine its next round’s dominant single AI model. In the specific case of 
Table 1, the dominant AI for all of the first 4 rounds is AI-1. In round 5, AI-2 has the 
best cumulative score and thus is the dominant AI. 
 
Player played: R S P S S P R R P S R S S S P S P S R P S S
AI 1 played: P P S P S S R R R R R S R R P R R P S R P R
AI 1 Score 1 -1 1 -1 0 1 0 0 -1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1
AI 1 Last 5 Rounds Total Score: 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 3 2 3 2 0 -2 -3 -5
AI 2 played: P P S S P S R S R S R R S S R R R R S R R R
AI 2 Score 1 -1 1 0 -1 1 0 -1 -1 0 0 1 0 0 -1 1 -1 1 -1 -1 1 1
AI 2 Last 5 Rounds Total Score: 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 -1 -2 -1 -2 -1 0 1 0 1 -1 0 -1 -1 -1
AI 3 played: S P P P S P P P R R R R S P R P R P R R S P
AI 3 Score -1 -1 0 -1 0 0 1 1 -1 1 0 1 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 0 -1 0 -1
AI 3 Last 5 Rounds Total Score: 0 -1 -2 -2 -3 -3 -2 0 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 -1 -2 -4 -5 -4 -4 -3
AI 4 played: R S S P P R R S R R S R P R S R P S R R S S
AI 4 Score 0 0 1 -1 -1 -1 0 -1 -1 1 -1 1 -1 1 1 1 0 0 0 -1 0 0
AI 4 Last 5 Rounds Total Score: 0 0 0 1 0 -1 -2 -2 -4 -4 -2 -2 -1 -1 1 1 3 2 3 2 0 -1
AI 5 played: P P S P P P R R S P R R S R R P P R S R S R
AI 5 Score 1 -1 1 -1 -1 0 0 0 1 -1 0 1 0 1 -1 -1 0 1 -1 -1 0 1
AI 5 Last 5 Rounds Total Score: 0 1 0 1 0 -1 -2 -1 -2 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 -1 0 -2 -2 -1
Multi AI = AI1 AI1 AI1 AI1 AI2 AI1 AI1 AI1 AI3 AI3 AI3 AI3 AI3 AI1 AI1 AI1 AI1 AI1 AI4 AI4 AI4 AI2
Multi AI played: P P S P P S R R R R R R S R P R R P R R S R
Table 1 shows how our multi-AI algorithm competes against a specific player when F= 
5 as an example. The transition matrix for the last AI-2 seeing the player played “PS” 
in the past 2 rounds is: 
 Thus for the next round, AI-2 has 1/3 probability to roll Paper, 
Scissors and Rock. 
Table 2 shows an example for the selection between AI-1 and AI-4 when focus length 
F= 5. Although globally AI-1 has a higher score in total (from the first round AI-1 has 
a total score of 2, but its recent 5 rounds score is 0), AI-4 has a higher score (which is 
3 in this case) locally during the recent 5 rounds. Thus the next round multi-AI will pick 
AI 4’s result as our multi-AI output. 
Table 2. Selection between AI-1 and AI-4 when focus length F = 5. 
         Next Round AI  
AI 1 W W D W W D L L AI 4 
AI 4 L L L W D W W D 
 
The transition matrix for AI-2 after 20 rounds of competition is in Table 3: 
Table 3: The transition matrix for AI-2 after 20 rounds of competition. 
 RR RS RP PR PP PS SR SP SS 
R 0 1/18 1/18 0 0 1/18 1/18 3/18 1/18 
P 0 0 0 1/18 0 2/18 0 1/18 0 
S 1/18 1/18 0 0 0 1/18 1/18 0 2/18 
 
 
 
R P S
PS 1/3 1/3 1/3
 Results 
All experiments are conducted with money incentive. We did the experiment with 52 
human subjects recruited at Zhejiang University and used a multi-AI model which has 
5 or 10 single length Markov chain models. Figure 1 shows 4 typical results of our 
multi-AI strategy with a combination of the 1st to 5th order Markov chain models (here 
focus length F is also set to 5, but it can be any other integer) competition against 4 
typical players for 300 rounds.  
 
 
Figure 1: AI 300 rounds competition results for 4 typical players. 
 
The total score for the multi-AI against 52 people are shown in Figure 2. Against one 
player, multi-AI with a combination of 5 models had a score of 151, which is 198 wins, 
55 draws and only 47 losses, more than 4 times of human total wins. Fig. 1.d is an 
example of a player who beat the AI by a margin of 4, and this is not a statistically 
meaningful margin as there are several lead changes. 
 
Figure 2: Total scores for multi-AI competing against different players in 300 
rounds game. 
42 players played against the multi-AI with focus length F=5 and AI-1 to AI-5(see blue 
bars in Fig. 2) and 11 players played against the multi-AI with focus length F=10 and 
AI-1 to AI-10 (see orange bars in Fig. 2). From the overall results in Table 5, we see 
that our multi-AI algorithm with F=10 give similar scores, but has lower standard 
deviation than that with F=5. 
For simplicity, we let multi-5AI denote our multi-AI model with a combination of the 
1st to 5th order Markov chain models (here focus length F is also set to 5, but it can be 
any other integer), and multi-10AI denote our multi-AI model with a combination of 
the 1st to 10th order Markov chain models (focus length F is also set to 10).  
52 people’s preferences in choosing Rock Paper Scissors in their 300 rounds 
competition are shown in Table 4. There is a slight preference in choosing Rock, which 
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Multi AI with Markov Chain Lengths 1-5 Multi AI with Markov Chain Lengths 1-10
is consistent with some previous human vs human studies. 
Table 4: 52 people’s preferences in choosing Rock Paper Scissors in 300 rounds 
competitions. 
 R P S 
MEAN (times) 106.6098 96.29268 97.09756 
STDEV.S 13.08095 13.12239 12.11851 
 
We looked at the performance of individual models within a multi-AI 300 game set. 
The AI which performs the best against a particular individual varies greatly, but overall 
AI 2-6 perform better than AI 1 or higher-order Markov chains of longer memory length. 
This general trend is consistent with human short memory holding around 7 items21. 
Table 5: Game results (total scores) of our multi-10AI competing with human in 
300 rounds. 
 
 
Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 show AI with different memory lengths’ performance against specific 
human players. 
 
AI1 AI2 AI3 AI4 AI5 AI6 AI7 AI8 AI9 AI10 10 single models average score multi-10AI score multi-5AI score
Player1 -13 37 24 20 22 14 -6 -2 -10 3 8.9 10
Player2 2 50 48 42 42 50 61 7 12 5 31.9 41
Player3 46 58 52 53 24 29 11 -15 -14 12 25.6 8
Player4 26 41 26 55 46 28 20 13 10 36 30.1 34
Player5 35 39 92 107 85 67 88 61 78 70 72.2 73
Player6 28 60 52 55 49 36 14 1 -18 12 28.9 43
Player7 56 63 68 65 55 46 54 -1 -14 17 40.9 48
Player8 28 29 47 29 12 5 21 5 -10 -5 16.1 43
Player9 32 63 58 72 62 72 32 26 20 15 45.2 59
Player10 -5 -14 -8 11 16 -7 -26 19 20 23 2.9 24
Player11 40 15 33 16 9 24 25 -9 6 37 19.6 9
MEAN 25.00 40.09 44.73 47.73 38.36 33.09 26.73 9.55 7.27 20.45 29.30 35.64 37.39
STDEVA 21.61 23.57 26.02 28.36 23.93 24.52 31.69 20.76 27.38 20.86 19.05 21.21 33.12
 Figure 3: Game results (total scores) of Multi-10AI competing with human in 300 
rounds.  
 
Figure 4: Game results (total scores) of multi-AI with Markov chain lengths 1-5 
competing with 8 typical players in 300 rounds. 
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 It is hard to build one single model that can exploit every different human’s behavior, 
and thus we decided to combine the single models to make it able to differentiate and 
adapt to more different human competition strategies and win over most of its 
opponents.  
 
 
Discussion and conclusions  
In this paper, we have introduced a multi-AI model that wins over human in iterated 
RPS games and experimentally confirmed our results. We found that using a single-
length Markov model could beat most human players, but not all human players.  
In single model experiments, we found the model with the best performance varies 
greatly for different people, which indicates that different people have different patterns. 
Although different humans have different patterns, and in total the patterns may be very 
hard to observe and exploit. Human competition behavior indeed has patterns and the 
patterns are exploitable by using proper simple models (single models that successfully 
predict this human’s behavior). We have obtained and exploited different human 
behaviors by building and combining single Markov chain models of different memory 
lengths and during the competition process it learns and switch to the best prediction 
model according to its focus length. We have introduced one possible architecture for 
human AI RPS games competition, and this model could be further improved by e.g., 
optimizing the voting weights of single Markov chain models, using the first part of the 
competition data to pre-train multi-AI model and switch to only two or three dominant 
single models after the pre-training process. Focus length is a hyper parameter and can 
be tested by more human experiments for further optimization. After rearranging single 
models and adjusting “focus length” our model can potentially be improved further. 
The competition behavior patterns and their successful exploitation may lead our future 
work to better modeling, predicting and adapting to different specific human’s 
competition behavior patterns.  
 
 
Methods 
Experiment 
Our methods for experiment mostly follows the RPS social experiments conducted in 
the period of December 2010 to March 2014 by Zhijian Wang et al.13. The experiment 
was approved by the Experimental Social Science Laboratory of Zhejiang University 
and performed at Zhejiang University in the period of July 2019 to September 2019. 
The first author confirms that this experiment was performed in accordance with the 
approved social experiments guidelines and regulations. A total number of 52 
undergraduate and graduate students of Zhejiang University volunteered to serve as 
the human subjects of this experiment. These students were openly recruited at the 
university library through onsite volunteer recruitment. More female students were 
registered than male students due to the humanity subjects of our experiment (more 
female students in the related humanity subjects in our university). Since we sampled 
students uniformly at random from the candidate list, more female students were 
recruited than male students. Informed consent was obtained from all the participating 
human subjects. 
The 360 human subjects (referred to as players in this work) carried one experimental 
session by playing the RPS game for 300 rounds with fixed payoff parameter a =2. 
During the game process the players were seated separately in a classroom, each 
facing a computer screen. They were not allowed to communicate with each other 
during the whole experimental session. Written instructions were handed out to each 
player and the rules of the experiment were also orally explained by an experimental 
instructor. The rules of the experimental session are as follows: 
i. Each player plays the RPS game repeatedly with our computer program. 
ii. Each player earns virtual points during the experimental session according to 
the payoff matrix shown in the written instruction. These virtual points are 
then exchanged into RMB as a reward to the player, plus an additional 5 RMB 
as show-up fee. 
iii. After a choice has been made it cannot be changed. 
Before the start of the actual experimental session, the player were asked four 
questions to ensure that they understand completely the rules of the experimental 
session. These four questions are: (1) If you choose “Rock” and your opponent 
chooses “Scissors”, how many virtual points will you earn? (2) If you choose “Rock” 
and your opponent also chooses “Rock”, how many virtual points will you 
earn? (3) If you choose “Scissors” and your opponent chooses “Rock”, how many 
virtual points will you earn? (4) Do you know that at each game round you will play 
with an AI opponent? 
During the experimental session, the computer screen in front of each player will 
show an information window and a decision window. The window on the left of the 
computer screen is the information window. The upper panel of this information 
window shows the current game round, the time limit (40 seconds) of making a 
choice, and the time left to make a choice. The color of this upper panel turns to green 
at the start of each game round. The color will change to yellow if the player does not 
make a choice within 20 seconds. The color will change to red if the decision time 
runs out (and then the experimental instructor will loudly urge the players to make a 
choice immediately). The color will change to blue if a choice has been made by the 
player. After all the players of the group have made their decisions, the lower panel of 
the information window will show the player's own choice, the opponent's choice, and 
the player's own payoff in this game round. The player's own accumulated payoff is 
also shown. The players are asked to record their choices of each round on the record 
sheet (Rock as R, Paper as P, and Scissors as S). 
The window on the right of the computer screen is the decision window. It is activated 
only after all the players of the group have made their choices. The upper panel of this 
decision window lists the current game round, while the lower panel lists the three 
candidate actions “Rock”, “Scissors”, “Paper” horizontally from left to right. The 
player can make a choice by clicking on the corresponding action names. After a 
choice has been made by the player, the decision window becomes inactive until the 
next game round starts. 
The reward in RMB for each player is determined by the following formula. Suppose 
a player i earns xi virtual points in the whole experimental session, the total 
reward yi in RMB for this player is then given by where r is the exchange 
rate between virtual point and RMB. According to the mixed-strategy Nash 
equilibrium, the expected payoff of each player in one game round is (1 + a)/3. 
Therefore we set the exchange rate to be r = 0.45/(1 + a) to ensure that, under the 
mixed-strategy NE assumption, the expected total earning in RMB for a player will be 
50 RMB irrespective of the particular experimental session. The value of the payoff 
parameter a, the numerical value of r, and the above-mentioned reward formula were 
listed in the written instruction and also orally mentioned by the experimental 
instructor at the instruction phase of the experiment. 
 
Data Availability 
All 52 players experiment data with all process data of Markov chains we used are 
provided in the supplementary information. 
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